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[Mianaged care [is] a vast shell game in which the pea is risk and
the players are the shell.... Each shell from time to time doffs his
hat and kicks the pea into somebody else's pocket. I
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[R]egulators and employers, those who are charged with protecting
consumers and policy-holders, are too often the last to know that the
hurricane just blew through the house. They need to have better
(and more timely) information about the true financial conditions of
the HMOs, PPOs, and networks they regulate or purchase ....
Right now there are more managed care organizations on the verge
of collapse than at any time in the past decade.
2




A central feature of managed care has been the shifting of the financial risk
of insuring against health expenditures away from managed care organizations
("MCOs"), and onto other parties in the health-financing system--employers,
providers of health care, and patients.4 Governmental tolerance for this risk
shifting has subsidized the participation of MCOs in the health-financing
system in the United States 5 by allowing MCOs to export the costs of doing
2 Barry Scheur, Compliance: It's Bigger Than You Think, I MANAGED CARE INSIDER 1
(Sept. 1999) (divulging that in the 1980s, his management group staffed the National
Association of Managed Care Regulators and authored "The HMO Regulatory Primer,"
which became the "regulatory bible"), available at http://www.scheur.com/scheur.nsf/smg/
newsletterVol ID I .htm.
I Leigh Page, Capitation at the Crossroads: The Trend Back to Fee for Service, 44 AM.
MED. NEWS 21 (Mar. 5, 2001) (quoting Stanley Borg, D.O., vice president of Health
Services, Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield in Colorado), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_01/bisa0305.htm.
I Andrd Hampton, Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and Abetting
America's Flight From Health Insurance, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 1008-09 (2000)
[hereinafter Hampton, Markets] (describing the mechanism by which insurers have
managed to avoid insurance risk by passing risk onto employers through self-funded health-
benefit plans and to providers through risk-sharing mechanisms); see also Andrd Hampton,
Resurrection of the Prohibition on the Corporate Practice of Medicine: Teaching Old
Dogma New Tricks, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 489, 493 (1998) [hereinafter Hampton, Corporate
Practice] (noting that "health care financing increasingly involves arrangements that shift
some of the financial risk of health care expenditures from insurance companies and other
payers of health care services to physicians and other providers"); id. at 517 ("[I]nsurance
companies have required patients to assume larger portions of the first dollar [of] care by
imposing higher deductibles and co-insurance requirements.").
I See Hampton, Markets, supra note 4, at 987-93. The article argues that governmental
policies, which allow the health insurance industry to enter into arrangements in which other
parties bear the risk for health care expenditures, allow the health insurance industry to
export the cost of conducting its business. The author describes this process as the
exploitation of a negative externality. A negative externality is an activity that generates
costs that the actor does not need to take into account when deciding to engage in the
activity. The classic example is pollution associated with the manufacture of a good. If the
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business to others. 6 This subsidization has helped to perpetuate the myth that
the private-sector provision of health insurance remains a viable health-
financing policy for the United States.7 To the extent that governmental policy
seeks to curtail MCOs from shifting financial risk to others in the health care
system, private-sector insurers will find it harder to justify participation in
health care financing.
8
This Article examines the Texas Attorney General's effort to curtail risk
shifting by MCOs operating in the State of Texas. The Texas Attorney
General has addressed a primary technique used by managed care to shift
financial risk to providers of health care services. MCOs accomplish financial
risk shifting either through direct contracts with individual physicians or by
contracts with intermediary physician groups. 9 These intermediary physician
manufacturer does not need to account for the harm caused by the pollution, this cost will
not be reflected in the manufacturer's decisions to produce the good, or in the price charged
for the good. Requiring actors to account fully for the costs associated with their activities
increases the costs associated with that activity. Conversely, not requiring them to
internalize those costs provides them with an implicit subsidy. The article takes the position
that the insurance industry has been the beneficiary of an implicit subsidy because of
governmental policies that have not required the industry to bear the costs of operating
health insurance programs. This current Article places the activities of the Texas Attorney
General in the context of a government policy, which attempts to require the health
insurance industry to internalize costs.
6 Id. at 991 (demonstrating the private insurance industry's success in passing on risks to
other entities in the health care system by describing the rise of self-funded benefit
programs, under which employers agree to assume a portion of their employees' health care
risk, and of risk sharing arrangements, under which health care providers agree to assume a
portion of their patients health care risks).
7 Id. at 992 ("The managed care industry has created the temporary illusion that we can
have access to adequate and affordable health coverage through operation of the insurance
model in the free market."). This illusion was aided and abetted by the implicit subsidy
described in note 5, supra.
8 Id. at 1038 ("To the extent that we collectively seek to curtail their exploitation of
externalities in the health system, insurers and employers engage in or threaten a flight from
health insurance which threatens to leave even fewer people protected by health coverage.").
I See Hampton, Corporate Practice, supra note 4, at 511. Under the group method, the
organized group of physicians usually accepts a capitation arrangement, whereby the group
accepts capitation payments from the payer and takes responsibility for compensating the
individual physicians from those payments. This is the "primary technique" referred to in
the text. Id.; see also Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance Regulation of Providers
That Bear Risk, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 361 (1996) (discussing health care providers,
most notably physician-hospital organizations, that agree to bear the risk for medical
expenses by accepting partial or total capitation payments for a portion of patients); Ericka
L. Rutenberg, Managed Care and the Business of Insurance: When is a Provider Group
Considered to be at Risk?, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 267, 280-81 (1996) (describing a
typical MCO as a "system ... composed of physicians and secondary health care service
providers organized to manage costs directly affecting the delivery of health care services,"
and an MCO's achievement of shifting risk by arranging for payment systems that require a
2003]
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groups are referred to as "downstream" entities.' 0 Downstream entities are
commonly provider-sponsored organizations, such as Independent Practice
Associations ("IPAs"),"1 Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs"),
12
Management Services Organizations ("MSOs"),' 3 and Physician Hospital
Organizations ("PHOs"), 14 and they ultimately contract with the individual
flat fee per member).
10 See Douglas J. Witten, Regulation of "Downstream" and Direct Risk Contracting by
Health Care Providers: The Quest for Consumer Protection and a Level Playing Field, 23
AM. J.L. & MED. 449, 454-55 (1997) (discussing "no risk," "full risk," and "partial risk"
contracts in which managed care organizations commonly deal); see also RISK-BEARING-
ENTITIES WORKING GROUP OF THE STATE AND FED. HEALTH INS. LEGIS. POLICY (B) TASK
FORCE, NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, DRAFT NAIC WHITE PAPER ON RISK-BEARING
ENTITIES (Dec. 1996), reprinted in 6 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 73, 85 (Jan. 9, 1997)
[hereinafter NAIC DRAFT WHITE PAPER] (describing "downstream" risk arrangements as
agreements between insurance providers and "subcontractor provider entities," such as
organizations or individuals, that call for the latter to assume part of the former's risk); infra
note 210 (referring to House Bill 2828 ("HB 2828") in Texas where these entities are
statutorily defined as delegated entities and delegated networks); Marsha R. Gold et al.,
Provider Organizations at Risk: A Profile of Major Risk-Bearing Intermediaries, 1999, 20
HEALTH AFF. 175, 175 (Mar.-Apr. 2001) (describing these entities as "intermediaries").
I I An IPA is defined as
the simplest form of physician organization. It is an organization composed of
individual practitioners who partially integrate their practices through sharing risk in
managed care contracting. An IPA contracts with payers to arrange for the provision
of medical services and with individual physicians to provide services under those
payer contracts arranged by the IPA. Because the IPA is nominally capitalized, it is
attractive to physicians who have no prior experience with managed care or practicing
as a group.
SHERYL DACSO & CLIFFORD DACSO, THE MANAGED CARE ANSWER BOOK, Q 6:21-Q 6:25
(4th ed. 2000).
12 A PPO is an entity through which employer benefit plans and insurance carriers
purchase health care services through a loosely aggregated group of providers who agree to
negotiated, discounted fee-for-service rates in return for prompt payment. Most PPOs use
utilization-management techniques to control costs and quality and are attractive to
consumers because of enhanced choice of providers. PPOs are not governed by federal
statutes but are regulated by many states. Id. at Q 3:17-Q 3:20.
13 An MSO is defined as
a business that provides management services to physicians and physician groups. The
MSO can be hospital affiliated, physician owned, jointly owned, or investor
owned .... MSOs develop out of the perceived need for separating the business and
management functions for the medical practice .... The MSO often functions as an
administrator of managed care contracts on behalf of its managed entities, in addition
to the more common MSO services, such as furnishing facilities, staff, and support
services.
Id. at Q 6:28-Q 6:29.
14 A PHO is defined as
a form of joint venture managed care contracting organization ... that can offer to
HMOs and managed care contractors both inpatient hospital and professional health
care services on a risk basis. A PHO is similar to an HMO for contracting purposes,
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physicians who provide health care. It is the relationship between the
downstream entity and the individual physicians that ultimately affects patient
care, the doctor-patient relationship, and the quality of care. 15 However,
because state regulations and statutes often focused on the managed care plan
(typically, the HMO), there had been little attention focused on the
downstream entities and how those entities subcontracted with individual
physicians. 16  Now, largely because of spectacular IPA bankruptcies in
California,' 7 New Jersey 8 and, to a lesser degree, in Texas,' 9 the regulatory
community throughout the United States has made the regulation of
downstream entities its number one priority. 20 Some prescient regulators have
but it represents a slightly broader group of providers.
Id Q 6:34-Q 6:37.
15 See Marc Ballon, State Demands Financial Data of Physician Groups, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 2001, at Cl (describing California's attempt to protect consumers from being left
without medical care by heightening regulation of intermediary physician organizations),
available at http://www.latimes.com; see also infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text
(describing Texas lawsuits alleging patient damages resulting from financial incentives
imposed on physicians).
16 See Linda R. Brewster et al., Insolvency and Challenges of Regulating Providers That
Bear Risk, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE ISSUE BRIEF No. 26 (Feb.
2000) (discussing states' and Congress's lack of regulatory scrutiny of provider groups and
contracting intermediaries in risk delegation arrangements), available at http://www
.hschange.org/CONTENT/56/; see also infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text
(describing a regulatory approach to downstream entities).
17 Id. at 4 (describing the disruptive effects on California's health care system after two
national provider groups declared bankruptcy).
1 Id at 2 (describing the financial collapse of a major HMO, leaving 190,000 New
Jersey residents without health care and $120 million in unpaid insurance claims to doctors
and hospitals).
'9 See Mary Sit-DuVall, Swallowing a Bitter Pill; Group That Ran Physicians' Practices
Got Overwhelmed, Leaving Doctors Holding Bag, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 4, 2000,
(describing the financial collapse of the North American Management Organization in
Houston with resultant problems for the patients and doctors of the nineteen IPAs it
managed), available at 2000 WL 24523592.
20 See generally Minutes of Managed Care Organization Working Group, Dallas, Tex.,
Sept. 11, 2000 (on file with author); see also Downstream Contracting and Delegation
Summit, Proceedings of the National Association of Managed Care Regulators, Nov. 13-15,
2000 (obtainable from Sheri Hiroms, Palomar Financial, L.C., Austin, Tex.,
slhiroms@palomar-lc.com (proceedings on file with author)); Minutes of Managed Care
Organization Working Group, Boston, Mass., Dec. 3, 2000 (on file with author); Minutes of
Managed Care Organization Working Group conference call, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), Feb. 28, 2001 (on file with author); see also NAT'L
Ass'N OF MANAGED CARE REGULATORS, Executive Summary, DOWNSTREAM RISK &
DELEGATION 4 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter NAMCR] (describing appropriate regulatory
attention to MCO risk-sharing arrangements as "one of the most complex and serious
challenges faced by regulators at this time"), available at http://www.namcr.org/_
members/memresources.asp.
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learned that the financial failures of downstream entities are more than just a
matter of who pays the bills. These failures are intimately related to continuity
of care and other consumer-quality issues.2'
It was in this context that then-Texas Attorney General Dan Morales filed
suit against six HMOs in December 1998.22 The Office of the Attorney
General ("OAG") charged that the HMOs were illegally using financial
incentives to induce physicians to deny patients medically necessary care.23 In
April 2000, the OAG announced it had reached a settlement with Aetna, the
nation's largest HMO. The settlement agreement, called an Assurance of
Voluntary Compliance ("AVC"), 24 set out in comprehensive detail how Aetna
would conduct its HMO business in Texas. The most striking aspect of the
AVC was its provisions attempting to make Aetna responsible for the financial
relationship between downstream entities and individual providers. 25 This was
a bold move because the authority for achieving this through the regulatory
powers given to the Texas Department of Insurance ("TDI") was
questionable. 26 The AVC was initially termed a "landmark" document that
21 See Ballon, supra note 15 (quoting Daniel Zingale, the Director of the California
Department of Managed Health Care, who noted that physician-group failures in California
disrupted care and caused confusion among 2.5 million patients, and who justified the
reason for increased attention to the financial health of physician groups by stating that
"[o]ur goal is to protect consumers, who get hurt when medical groups fail"); see also
Tipton Blish, Medical Group Failure Results in New Policies, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001
(quoting Zingale on California's new financial-reporting rule for medical groups that engage
in downstream contracts). Zingale said: "The bigger picture is that this experience
underscores that financial instability in managed health care directly affects patient quality
of care. It's another example of the financial negotiations being drawn out at the expense of
patients."
22 See Plaintiffs Original Petition and Application for Injunctive Relief, State v. Aetna
U.S. Health Care, Inc., No. 98-13972 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1998) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Petition,
Aetna]; see also Travis E. Poling & Laura Tolley, HMOs Seeking Talks on Contracts, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Dec. 18, 1998, at ID (describing the Texas Attorney General's
filing of charges against six HMOs for engineering illegal coverage arrangements with
physicians).
23 Plaintiff's Petition, Aetna, supra note 22, at 1.3.
24 Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, State v. Aetna U.S. Health Care, Inc., No. 98-
13972 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter AVC, Aetna]; see Press Release, Office of
the Attorney General, State of Texas, Cornyn Announces Landmark Agreement with Aetna
U.S. Healthcare (Apr. 11, 2000) (announcing the settlement), available at http://
www.oag.state.tx.us/newspubs/99_00pressrel.htm; see also Press Release, Aetna Inc.,
Aetna U.S. Healthcare and the Texas Attorney General Announce Agreement on Guidelines
for Texas HMOs (Apr. 11, 2000) (Aetna's press release on the settlement), available at
http://www.aetna.com/news/2000/prtpr_20000411 .htm.
25 See infra notes 165-206 and accompanying text (describing the AVC's handling of
financial risk).
26 See infra notes 129-54 and accompanying text (describing the regulatory power of TDI
that existed at the time the lawsuit was filed).
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would affect the way managed care is practiced far beyond the borders of the
state of Texas.27 As a result of the AVC, Aetna changed the way it contracted
with physicians and rolled out an image of a "kinder and gentler" HMO. 28
However, to the extent that the AVC succeeds in establishing a model for the
country, it will represent an additional hindrance to financial risk shifting by
HMOs. HMOs have already begun to react to this prospect by introducing
new health care plans which move risk to the patients instead. 29
This Article examines the AVC as an attempt to regulate financial risk
shifting by MCOs. This Article will demonstrate that the AVC represents an
attempt to regulate managed care practices that have long been resistant to
effective regulation. The AVC is an approach to policymaking that
undermines managed care's ability to insulate itself from financial risk.
Furthermore, the AVC attempts to make the process of risk shifting more
transparent. If the process is more transparent, the true costs associated with
the provision of health insurance will be borne by the MCOs.
Part I of this Article examines the widespread practice of downstream
contracting at the national level. Notwithstanding these problems, recognition
that downstream contracting requires governmental regulation has been slow to
develop and has been hindered by disagreements over just what type of risk
shifting should be regulated by states as the "business of insurance."
Part II of this Article examines the statutory and regulatory bases for
overseeing downstream risk in Texas at the time the OAG filed suit against six
HMOs operating in Texas. The Texas statutes prohibit HMOs from using
financial incentives to induce physicians to limit medically necessary services.
However, the statute did not clearly give the TDI any regulatory authority to
obtain the information that would be most relevant to enforcing that
prohibition-that is, how the downstream entity compensates the individual
providers. In light of this statutory void, it is apparent that the OAG may have
achieved more through the AVC than would have been possible through the
regulatory process.
Part III of this Article analyzes the AVC entered into by the OAG and the
27 Paul Stordahl, Health Plans Should Consider Proactive Response to Aetna's Texas
Settlement, HEALTH PLAN ADVISOR (May 2000) (newsletter of the Towers-Perrin
Consulting Company) (announcing that the AVC may represent "a foundation for the next
generation of consumer-driven managed care," and that, "the agreement may well mark the
standard for acceptable market conduct by which other attorneys general will abide"); see
also John Cornyn, Aetna Settlement Protects Consumers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5,
2000, at 37A. At the time the AVC was executed, John Comyn was the Texas Attorney
General.
28 See Joseph B. Treaster, Aetna's Chief Financial Officer Will Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2001, at B2 (quoting Kenneth S. Abramowitz, one of Wall Street's foremost analysts of
the managed care industry).
29 See infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text (describing the rising phenomenon of
"defined contribution" plans, pursuant to which employers provide employees with a lump-
sum payment in lieu of health insurance coverage for non-catastrophic health expenses).
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Aetna HMO concerning how Aetna would conduct its HMO business in Texas.
This Part will evaluate the AVC's provisions on downstream financial risk in
the context of the uncertain regulatory authority of the TDI to reach down to
the level of the contract between the downstream entities and the individual
providers with whom that entity contracted.
I. REGULATION OF FINANCIAL RISK SHIFTING
A. Risk Shifting by Managed Care Organizations
An important feature of managed care is the transfer of risk from insurers of
health care to providers of care.30 MCOs compensate physicians by a number
of arrangements that relieve the MCO of the financial risk associated with
health care expenditures. These include capitation, risk pools with fee
withholds that can be for both upside and downside risk, global fees, and
percent-of-premium arrangements.3' The key concept in all risk-transfer
arrangements is that the transferor seeks to limit the risk that its obligations
will exceed its collected payments by transferring that risk to others. 32 The
MCO may engage in risk shifting by directly contracting with individual
providers. 33  However, in many situations, the MCO contracts with an
intermediary physician organization, which in turn contracts with the
individual physician. 34 In addition, these intermediary entities may further
downstream risk to individual physicians, such as primary care and specialist
physicians. 35 The effect of these arrangements is that there may be several
31 See Hampton, Corporate Practice, supra note 4, at 505-06 (describing capitation
arrangements, pursuant to which physicians are compensated according to the number of
patients assigned to the physicians, as opposed to a fee schedule for services actually
rendered, and fee withholding arrangements, pursuant to which a portion of a physician's
fees are withheld and only paid to the physician to the extent that the physician's treatment
decisions meet financial targets established by the managed care company); see also
Hampton, Markets, supra note 4, at 10 13-20 (describing in detail a variety of risk-sharing
arrangements).
31 Hampton, Markets, supra note 4, at 1013-20 (naming and describing each of the listed
risk-sharing arrangements).
32 See Hampton, Corporate Practice, supra note 4, at 505-06 (discussing risk sharing
arrangements and their utility as cost-containment systems for payers of insurance moneys
accomplished by forcing physicians and other spenders to bear certain costs, thereby
providing incentive to keep costs low).
33 See id at 509 (describing individualized risk sharing in which a physician shares risks
for the physician's own patients and not other patients, resulting in "direct financial
consequence to the physician each time the physician referred a patient to a specialist or
admitted a patient to a hospital").
31 Id. at 511 (describing pooled risk-sharing arrangements with a group practice or an
IPA in which a group of physicians' compensation is placed at risk based on the entire
group's performance as opposed to any particular physician's performance).
31 Id. at 511 n. 130 (describing "three-tiered arrangements" pursuant to which "the HMO
(Vol. 83:553
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layers of organization between the physician who renders the services and the
HMO that was originally responsible for payments and which holds the
necessary state licenses to operate a risk-bearing enterprise. This has served to
obscure the reality that the HMO, which holds the state license, should
ultimately be held responsible for the provision of care and payment to
physicians.
B. The Importance of Downstream Entities
Intermediary entities are numerous, and they have accepted delegated
responsibilities from the HMOs for payment of physicians and monitoring the
quality of care provided to patients. The importance of these entities means
that it is incumbent upon the government to regulate their operations in order
to assure the quality of patient care and the viability of patient-care networks.
Ignoring the significance of the intermediary organizations leads to poor
quality and financial instability of patient-care networks.
A recently published 1999 survey examined "intermediate entities" (another
name for the intermediary physician organizations an HMO contracts with that
in turn contract with other health care providers). 36 The survey included
twenty study markets in the United States.37 Sixty-four of the intermediary
entities contacted responded to the survey, representing only one-third of the
contacted entities.38 The sixty-four entities that responded accounted for ten
million patients covered by HMOs.39 Of these ten million patients, 2.7 million
were covered under an arrangement in which the intermediary had accepted a
global-risk contract with the HMO.40 Approximately 6.3 million patients were
covered by arrangements in which the intermediary had entered into a
professional-risk contract with the HMO. 4 1 The intermediaries' dominant
sources of revenue were risk based, with about forty percent of those
organizations receiving more than half of their revenues from risk-based
sources. 42 Fewer than five percent of entities reported that payments received
from HMOs were "adequate. '43 These intermediaries also reported that they
contracts with some middle tier entity which in turn contracts with the individual
physicians").
36 Gold et al., supra note 10, at 175-76 (describing the authors' survey of "intermediate
entities" that engage in "large at-risk contracts" with HMOs).
17 Id. at 175 (article abstract).




42 Id. at 178 exhibit 2 (demonstrating that last fiscal year, thirty-nine percent of
intennediate entities derived fifty to ninety-nine percent of their revenues from risk-based
services).
13 Id. at 181 ("Most commonly, respondents characterized payments as 'somewhat
adequate' rather than 'not adequate."').
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entered into further downstream contracts: fifty-nine percent contracted with
large physician groups, thirty-eight percent with an IPA, and twenty-seven
percent with PHOs or Integrated Delivery Systems ("IDS").
44
The survey demonstrated that about sixty percent of the intermediaries
accepted responsibility for provider payments, 45 and in more than two-thirds of
the cases, these intermediary organizations accepted delegated responsibility
for quality assurance and encounter data development from the HMO.
46
Importantly, thirty-one percent were "greatly dissatisfied with the referring
plan's support and collaboration. '47 Twenty percent were unhappy with the
delegating HMO's "delegation of sufficient authority to match risk."'48 The
authors concluded that "problems occur when risk is shared in the absence of
equivalent authority and support," and that "there may be some reduction in
the amount of risk some entities bear."'49 The authors noted that in some
markets, there were questions as to whether some providers would ever
become adept at insurance functions such as managing risk and utilization.50
In fact, "many observers point to risk-bearing contracts as a key contributor to
the failure of [IPAs] .. .
Medical groups, individual physicians, and hospitals have all been unhappy
with capitation.52 Most of this displeasure comes from the inability to judge
accurately the risk of the insured population, resulting in financial losses-
44 Id. at 180.
41 Id. at 181 exhibit 4.
46 Id. (showing that 71.0 percent of intermediate entities accepted the delegated global
risk of the tasks of quality assurance and encounter data development).
47 Id. (assigning a score of four or below as indicating "great dissatisfaction," and finding
that thirty-one percent were "greatly dissatisfied").
48 Id. at 182 (listing ratings of intermediate entities' dissatisfaction with aspects of the
HMO relationship).
49 Id. at 182-83 (discussing implications of the survey results).
50 Id. at 184 (acknowledging the questionable ability of provider organizations in less
developed markets to effectively perform traditional insurance functions, and citing the
failure to manage costs or economically forced withdrawal as examples of more
fundamental problems).
11 See Cara S. Lesser & Paul B. Ginsburg, Back to the Future?: New Cost and Access
Challenges Emerge, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE ISSUE BRIEF No. 35
(Feb. 2001) (discussing the fact that risk contracting has fallen into disrepute among most
providers and the consequent steep decline of risk-shifting contracts entered into after
1999), available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/295.
52 See David R. Olmos & Michael A. Hiltzik, Doctors' Authority, Pay Dwindle Under
HMOs, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1995, at Al (detailing the material consequences, including
unemployment and bankruptcy, for California doctors resulting from the ascendance of
HMO-controlled health care); see also Page, supra note 3, at 17 ("Physicians are leaving
capitation because they lost money on it, disliked its emphasis on cost containment and saw
new opportunities in fee-for-servico medicine.").
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some of which are catastrophic. 53 The consequent turmoil caused by failures
of large medical groups and IPAs, all downstream contractors, has grabbed the
attention of state insurance regulators, who have had to deal with the problems
of displaced patients, unpaid doctors, unhappy HMOs, and legislators
demanding answers.54  Two important issues appear common to most
discussions of downstream risk: (1) how to assure that providers get paid 55 and
patients are held harmless; 56 and (2) how to assure that financial arrangements
do not adversely affect the quality of patient care.
57
C. Downstream-Entity Insolvencies
Bankruptcies by downstream contractors help to underscore the importance
of regulating the relationship between an HMO and its downstream
13 See Michael D. Dalzell, California Physicians Struggling-Problems Ahead for Other
States?, 8 MANAGED CARE MAG. (Oct. 1999) ("The California Medical Association says
115 of California's 300 large groups and IPAs have gone bankrupt or closed in the last three
years, and predicts that 34 more will do so by the end of this year."), available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9910/9910.calmodel.html); see also Peter
Wehrwein, The March of Capitation: Reversed or Just Delayed?, 6 MANAGED CARE MAG.
(Nov. 1997) (noting that capitation plans, although popular, have not overhauled the health
care system as dramatically as had been predicted), available at http://www.
managedcaremag.com/archives/9711/9711 .capitationpart I.shtml.
5' See Leigh Page, California Begins Asking Physician Groups About Finances, AM.
MED. NEWS 1 (Apr. 23, 2001) (reporting that new financial solvency standards for an
estimated 350 to 500 provider groups that accept insurance risk went into effect on May 15,
2001, and that the new rules are "milder" than those being developed in Colorado and New
York), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick 01/bil10423.htm.
55 Provider payment arrangements involve at least two issues: (1) solvency of the HMO
and/or provider group, and (2) the so-called "double pay" issue. Solvency requirements are
generally dealt with by state departments of insurance with no consistent standards
throughout the states. The "double pay" issue involves whether or not an HMO, having
paid a capitated fee to a downstream provider who then later goes bankrupt, is required by
law to pay the subcontracted providers who have, in fact, delivered care to patients. Only
three states have so-called "double pay" laws requiring the HMO to pay providers in the
case of a downstream entity's insolvency. Those states are Colorado, Maryland, and
Nevada. See also NAMCR, supra note 20, § VII.D (stating the opinion of the regulators
that "it should be clear that the MCO retains the ultimate financial responsibility where
other mechanisms to avoid double payment fail").
56 "Hold harmless" refers to not billing an insured even after an HMO or downstream
entity declares bankruptcy. See NAMCR, supra note 20, § VIII (advising that "[a]ll levels
of contracts must contain 'hold harmless' wording to protect the members/insured's [sic]
from any balance billing for covered services, even after an entity declares bankruptcy or is
liquidated").
57 See id. "The overriding concern of Federal and State regulators is the protection of
MCO members and insured's [sic]. They want members to receive timely, quality services
for which premiums were paid. Regulators must decide what method of oversight they want
to use to meet this responsibility." Id.
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contractors. There have been a number of large bankruptcies around the
country. The problem of downstream-entity insolvency brought on by the
transfer of risk from HMOs to medical groups first appeared in the mid-1990s
in California, where almost 400 medical groups care for nearly twenty million
HMO enrollees. 58 While only about ten percent of the medical groups took on
global risk and were licensed by the State of California, the remaining
unlicensed groups took on various degrees of risk, such as professional
services and pharmacy, threatening their financial viability. 59 Between 1997
and 1999, 115 physician groups in California declared bankruptcy. 60 These
insolvencies caused disruption and confusion for 2.5 million California HMO
enrollees. 61 The California Medical Association issued a report on September
2, 1999, predicting the "imminent collapse" of ninety percent of the physician
groups in the state. 62 A review in the New England Journal of Medicine
concluded that California physician groups were engaged in a "Darwinian
struggle for survival," where success depended on "avoiding the high-cost
patients who need us most.
'63
The wave of bankruptcies of provider risk-bearing groups that began in
California hit Texas with the collapse of FPA Medical Management, a large
national practice management company that took on global risk on behalf of
almost 1.4 million health plan members and 7,900 physicians. 64 FPA filed for
bankruptcy on July 19, 1998 with liabilities of $345.5 million and assets of
58 See Ballon, supra note 15 (describing the California Department of Managed Health
Care's decision to mandate periodical reports from 400 physician groups, and stating that
these groups "provide care to most of the 20 million Californians enrolled in HMOs or
managed-care plans").
51 See Brewster et al., supra note 16, at 5 (discussing the majority of the 300 or more
provider groups in California who do not accept global risk and are therefore neither
licensed nor regulated by the state, leading to "uncertain" financial conditions); see also
Thomas Bodenheimer, California's Beleaguered Physician Groups-Will They Survive?,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1064 (Apr. 6, 2000) (describing the relationship between HMOs and
physicians on the West Coast and the delegation of risk to physician groups, which has
resulted in California IPAs "perform[ing] certain tasks that are not performed by most IPAs
in other states").
6 See Dalzell, supra note 53.
61 See Ballon, supra note 15.
62 See Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1064 (discussing the highly publicized release of
the California Medical Association's report).
63 Id. at 1068 (observing that, because a very small fraction of patients require a very
large percentage of medical costs, refusing to enroll such patients "can mean financial
survival or even success, whereas enrolling them can spell ruin," and concluding that this
puts California physicians in the perverse position of being fiscally rewarded for avoiding
provision of care for patients who are most in need of it).
64 Milt Freudenheim, FPA Medical Files for Protection Under Bankruptcy Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 1998, at D5 (discussing the implications of FPA's bankruptcy).
[Vol. 83:553
FINANCIAL RISK SHIFTING BY MANAGED CARE
$46.3 million. 65 In California, where it operated under a limited HMO license,
FPA owed physicians an estimated $60 million.66  At the time of the
bankruptcy, FPA reportedly claimed that its contracts with its biggest
customer, PacifiCare, covering 200,000 enrollees, "did not cover doctors'
costs. ' 67 Wall Street analysts blamed FPA's financial woes on "risky contracts
with managed care companies.
68
MedPartners, one of the nation's largest physician management companies,
suffered financial collapse beginning in 1998 after going into debt for over one
billion dollars.69 In March 1999, California regulators seized control of
MedPartners' California-provider network, which had 140 practice groups,
twenty-three IPAs, 4,000 physicians, and 1.3 million HMO patients. 70 In late
1999, MedPartners owed California physicians $50 million in unpaid claims. 7 1
In New Jersey, in 1997, the state's fourth largest HMO, HIP, in financial
trouble, with the approval of state regulators offloaded risk to a provider-
management company, PHP Healthcare Corporation.72 This subcontracting
arrangement was not regulated by state law, but the state expected the HMO to
be the ultimate guarantor of all contractual obligations. 73 A year later, both
PHP and HIP collapsed with providers receiving thirty cents on the dollar for
debts.
74
In Houston, North American Medical Management ("NAMM"), a
physician-management company, for a decade took on global risk from HMOs
on behalf of 1,800 physicians in nineteen IPAs, largely through capitation
contracts. 75 On August 31, 2000, TDI placed NAMM's operations under its
supervision due to failure to pay providers. 76 One Houston IPA claimed it lost
over one million dollars.
77
65 Id.
66 Brewster, supra note 16, at 4-5 (discussing concerns over the insolvencies of provider
groups and legislation passed in response).
67 Freudenheim, supra note 64.
68 Id.
69 Bodenheimer, supra note 59, at 1066 (discussing the financial troubles of California's
physician groups).
" Id. at 1066-67.
71 Id. at 1067.
72 Brewster, supra note 16, at 2 (discussing New Jersey's response to the HIP-PHP
agreement and HIP's subsequent collapse).
71 Id. at 2.
74 Id. at 2-3.
75 Renae Merle & Tanya S. Rutledge, Physician-Groups Manager May Be on Verge of
Dying, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2000, (discussing the probability of NAMM going out of
business), available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26615203; Sit-DuVall, supra note 19 (discussing
NAMM "on the brink of collapse").
76 IPA Management Associates, L.P., Official Order of the Commissioner of Insurance
of the State of Texas, No. 00-1008, Aug. 31, 2000; Merle & Rutledge, supra note 75.
77 Sit-DuVall, supra note 19 (reporting that NAMM was "the victim of computer
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In January 2001, unpaid doctors and one HMO filed an involuntary chapter
7 bankruptcy petition against Heritage Southwest Medical Group, P.A., the
largest IPA in Dallas, Texas, alleging millions of dollars in unpaid claims. 78
The IPA represented about 55,000 patients and 1,750 doctors in largely
capitated contracts with health plans. 79 Heritage's problems were blamed on
"[d]octors ... assuming the risk normally bome by an insurer." 80
In San Antonio on July 18, 2001, Quantum Southwest Medical Associates
("QSMA") and Quantum Southwest Medical Management, Inc. ("QSMM")
filed for bankruptcy protection. 8 1 QSMA was a 5.01(a) Approved Non-profit
Health Corporation ("ANHC") that delivered care to 45,000 PacifiCare HMO
patients via full-risk capitation contracts that amounted to $100 million in
revenue in fiscal year 2000.82 At the time of the bankruptcy filings, QSMM
had assets of $9.3 million and liabilities of $13.5 million, and QSMA had
assets of $15.4 million and liabilities of $27.3 million. 83 In late 2002, the
QSMM and QSMA bankruptcies were still not resolved, with the latest
reorganization plan calling for PacifiCare to assume a type of "double-pay"
role for the unsecured physician creditors by paying them an estimated thirty-
five cents on each dollar of debt owed.
84
On July 24, 2001, another 5.01(a) entity, Medical Select Management, Inc.
("MSM"), filed for bankruptcy in Fort Worth, Texas. 85 MSM accepted full-
risk contracts from PacifiCare and Aetna on behalf of 1,700 North Texas
physicians. 86 In the year 2000, MSM collected $155 million in capitated
premiums from Aetna and PacifiCare for approximately 200,000 enrollees but,
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, owed physicians over $21 million. 87 In
problems,. . . and many doctors have been caught in the middle").
18 See J. C. Conklin, Providers File Petition to Force Doctors' Group Into Chapter 7,
DALLAS MORNrNG NEWS, Jan. 11, 2001, at ID.
79 Id.
'o See J. C. Conklin, Independent Doctors' Groups Shaken by Woes, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001, at IH.
81 Consolidated Debtors' Second Amended Disclosure Statement at 1, In re Quantum
S.W. Med. Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-53321-LMC (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 18, 2001) [hereinafter
Disclosure Statement, Quantum].
82 Id.
83 W. Scott Bailey, Medical Group 's Bankruptcy Reveals Flaw in System, Observers Say,
SAN ANTONIO Bus. J., Aug. 3, 2001, at 1, 59.
84 See Disclosure Statement, Quantum, supra note 81, at 6-7 (calling for PacifiCare to
pay over $4 million to a settlement trust, which would result in providers' recovering
approximately thirty-five percent of their claims).
85 Statement of Jos6 Montemayor, Texas Insurance Commissioner, Physician/Provider
News from the Texas Department of Insurance (July 24, 2001) (on file with author).
86 Id.; see also Trebor Banstetter, Group Files for Chapter II Medical Select Has $40
Million in Debts and $17 Million in Assets, Documents Show, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, July 26, 2001, at B2.
87 Trebor Banstetter, Bankrupt Group Owes Doctors Millions, FORT WORTH STAR-
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late 2002, the MSM bankruptcy was not resolved, with over 200 physicians
retaining counsel to sue PacifiCare directly for monies owed. 88 Referring to
the collapse of Quantum and MSM, Jos6 Montemayor, the Texas Insurance
Commissioner, said the full-risk model for contracting is "a particular model
that is not working."
89
D. Lawsuits Over Financial Incentives
The relationship between the financial incentives inherent in risk shifting
and the impact on patient care has not been lost on the legal community. In
Texas and elsewhere, a number of suits have been brought against HMOs and
their downstream contractors alleging that the downstream contractor financial
arrangement with an individual physician lead to a patient's harm.
In Zamora v. Health Texas, a San Antonio federal court case, two physicians
and ten patient-plaintiffs sued HealthTexas, a hospital-owned clinic and
medical-services organization, and four HMOs that had downstream contracts
with HealthTexas.90 The suit was brought under the ADA, claiming that
financial incentives were used to discriminate against patients with
disabilities. 91 Dr. Zamora, a rheumatologist, claimed he had been wrongfully
TELEGRAM, Aug. 24, 2001, at BI.
88 Telephone conversation with Robert Provan, lead counsel for several MSM providers
seeking full payment from PacifiCare for debts owed (Sept. 4, 2002).
89 See Bailey, supra note 83, at 59 (explaining that Montemayor looked forward to
working under the new HB 2828, which came into effect on September 1, 2001, and
observing that "[t]he new law means we won't have to wait for the train wreck to happen
and then pick up the luggage off the tracks"). But see Bob Carlson, Health Plans 'Financial
Instability Presents New Regulatory Challenges, MANAGED CARE, Oct. 1999 (reporting that
Montemayor acknowledged the regulatory challenge of "risk-assuming physician groups,
but said that Texas health plans were 'taking steps to protect themselves against insolvent
providers,"' and that "[t]he plans, to their credit, have done a marvelous job of policing
that"), available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9910/9910.states.html.
90 See Zamora v. HealthTexas Med. Group, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437-38 (W.D. Tex.
1998) (denying motion to dismiss in part, as plaintiff did not have to exhaust administrative
remedies, had standing to seek an injunction under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the
"ADA"), and stated claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act). For background on
Zamora, see Donna J. Blevins, The Lessons of Zamora: A Plaintiffs Perspective on Suing
HMOs, Presentation to the Medical & Health Care Litigation Symposium (Mar. 2, 2001)
(describing plaintiff's strategy); Donald B. Wilcox, Physicians and Managed Care-The
Texas Experience 4, Presentation to the Medical & Health Care Litigation Symposium (Mar.
2, 2001) (giving background on the case); Julie A. Jacob, Texas Physician Says His HMO
De-selection Violates ADA, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 24, 1997, at 1 (discussing the theory of
discrimination involved in the case).
91 Maro Robbins, Discrimination Lawsuit Targets HMOs: Claim Says Profits Put Before
Patients, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Nov. 5, 2000, at 1B (describing the merits of the
suit shortly before the beginning of trial); see also Milo Geyelin, A Disabled Attorney Puts
Civil-Rights Spin on HMO Litigation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2000, at 1A (discussing the use
of the ADA to protect doctors of the disabled).
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fired after advocating for his patients and had been berated at weekly
utilization-review meetings. 92 After a three-week trial, the parties reached a
confidential settlement.93 The Texas Medical Association (the "TMA") later
described the settlement as "an end [to] a multi-year successful effort to
develop a new remedy for patients and physicians for discriminatory treatment
by managed care entities, including clinics, which can act like 'mini-insurance
companies' in rationing services.
'94
Zamora is significant because it underscores the importance of the
downstream-entity's relationship with the individual practitioner. HealthTexas
clinic was a downstream provider that was an ANHC. 95 This provider was not
required to be licensed as an insurance company or an HMO under Texas law,
although it could accept global risk from a licensed HMO. 96 The court, in a
pretrial hearing, bifurcated the trial and set the trial of the downstream entity
first, to be followed by the trial of the HMOs only if the provider group was
found culpable. 97 This established the primary importance of the downstream
provider as the primary actor unable to place the blame on the HMO.
Financial incentives acting upon the downstream entity and used by the
downstream providers on their own providers were at the very heart of this
case.
In Ingram v. Harris Health Plan, Inc., three patient plaintiffs filed a class-
action suit against Harris Health Plan, a licensed HMO, and other defendants,
including MSM, an unlicensed downstream contractor.9" The suit charged the
92 See Geyelin, supra note 91.
93 See Wilcox, supra note 90, at 4; Blevins, supra note 90, at 2; Maro Robbins, Medical
Bias Suit Settled, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Nov. 23, 2000, at I B (describing settlement
efforts and the agreement).
94 See Wilcox, supra note 90, at 4.
9' See Texas Board of Medical Examiners, Non-Profit 162.001(b) Non-profit Health
Organizations, at http://www.tsbme.state.tx.us/institutions/nphorg.htm (accessed June 11,
2003) (listing HealthTexas as a section 162.001(b) nonprofit health organization).
Nonprofit health organizations are certified by the Board of Medical Examiners under Texas
Occupations Code section 162.001. See TEX. OcC. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (Vernon 2002).
This entity was previously called a "5.01(a)" organization because it was previously
certified under section 5.01(a) of the Medical Practice Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
4495b (Vernon 1999).
96 See infra note 129 and accompanying text (describing the regulation of downstream
entities in Texas).
97 See Maro Robbins, Testimony Begins in HMO Bias Suit: Claim Costs Drove Quality of
Care, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Nov. 8, 2000, at I B (noting that the current trial
focuses on the clinic, but a finding of discrimination will lead to a second trial against the
managed care organization).
98 See Order for Notice to Class Members of Pendency of Class Action, Conditional
Class Certification and Hearing on Proposed Settlement, Ingram v. Harris Health Plan, Inc.,
No. 598-CV-179 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Order for Notice, Ingram] (notifying
recipients of Harris Methodist Health Plan Insurance of the pendency of the class action suit
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defendants with failing to disclose financial incentives and using those
incentives as inducements to limit medically necessary care. 99 This case was
ultimately settled on March 20, 2000 with some $4.6 million set aside for a
settlement fund for a class of approximately 203,000 members from which
$33,500 went to three individual plaintiffs and $1.15 million for attorneys' fees
for class counsel.100
Another case indicates that an examination of the HMO's financial
relationship with its downstream contractor may not suffice to root out
significant financial incentives. In Barley v. Pugh, plaintiffs sued a Fort Worth
cardiologist, his medical group, and the decedent's HMO for medical
negligence, wrongful death, and commercial bribery. 1 1 The plaintiffs alleged
that the HMO's financial incentives, specifically a ten percent withhold, which
could vary upward or downward at the discretion of the HMO, induced the
cardiologist and his medical group to not do appropriate diagnostic studies and
to not give the patient a timely reference for aortic valve-replacement
surgery.'0 2 On the day before trial, the HMO settled with the plaintiffs for a
confidential amount. 10 3 The jury found for the plaintiffs, holding the doctor
blameless, the decedent nurse fifty percent contributorily negligent, and the
doctors' group responsible for the rest of the harm caused. 
04
Interestingly, the HMO paid the doctors' group pursuant to a discounted fee-
for-service schedule through contracts with the individual physician
cardiologists. 0 5 The group itself paid its employee physicians a base salary
plus bonus arrangement with the bonus being based on a Relative Value Unit
and the proposed settlement hearing); see also Harris Methodist HMO Members Challenge
Compensation Arrangements, 7 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 840 (May 21, 1998) (describing the
filing of the suit).
9 Order for Notice, Ingram, supra note 98.
100 See Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal at 15, Ingram (No. 598-CV-179)
(describing and approving of the settlement agreement).
"' See Cases of Interest Around the State: Charles Barley v. Billie R. Pugh, M.D., CA
No. 236-177180-99 (236th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex., Feb. 8, 1999), 5 TEXAS BLUE
SHEET, Feb. 19, 2001 [hereinafter BLUE SHEET] (describing the plaintiffs' claim and the
results of the case).
102 See Plaintiffs Sixth Amended Original Petition at 5, Barley v. Pugh, CA No. 236-
177180-99 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001) (alleging that the percentage of physician's
withheld fee could be "any amount determined by the HMO").
03 See Trebor Banstetter, Cigna Settles Wrongful Death Suit, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Mar. 1, 2001, at Al.
0.4 See BLUE SHEET, supra note 101.
'05 See Healthsource North Texas Preferred, Inc. Participating Physician Agreement with
Billie R. Pugh, M.D. (introduced at trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 45, dated Jan. 9, 1995),
Barley (CA No. 236-177180-99). Exhibit B to this agreement provides for payment for
physician's services pursuant to fee-for-service compensation subject to a maximum
allowable fee as established by Healthsource.
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("RVU") system. 10 6 The group's defense with regard to the role of managed
care financial incentives was that the doctors were blind to the influence of
managed care because they were compensated pursuant to a fee-for-service
schedule, which meant that the more they did, the more they were paid.'
0 7
However, Plaintiffs alleged that a close analysis of the RVU system indicated
that cardiologists received no RVU points for doing chest x-rays and ECGs,
two of the most important diagnostic tools doctors use, but did receive RVUs
for attending group business meetings and meetings of a closely related
physician-controlled 5.01(a) organization. 108
In Correll v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., plaintiff brought a wrongful death
claim against an HMO, numerous physicians, and, importantly, the Heritage
Southwest Medical Group, an unlicensed downstream contractor.10 9 The suit
alleged that the decedent had died from complications of late-diagnosed
inflammatory bowel disease after over forty physicians' visits over a several-
month period without access to appropriate specialist management and
diagnostic testing.11°  The suit specifically charged the defendants with
violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (the "DTPA") and the
Texas HMO Act, particularly indicating the use of financial incentives to place
"money over medicine.""' This case was ultimately resolved confidentially
without a trial."
12
E. National Approach to the Regulation of Downstream Entities
The regulation of downstream entities such as IPAs is made difficult
because, in many states, they do not have to be licensed. 13 That stems from a
consensus among insurance regulators that the assumption of downstream risk
is subcontracting or service risk and not the business of insurance. 114 As long
106 See Spread Sheet of RVUs by Quarter 96-97 and Consultants in Cardiology Inter-
office Memo (Plaintiffs Exhibit 66 dated Sept. 15, 1997), Barley (CA No. 236-177180-99)
[hereinafter Spread Sheet, Barley].
107 Telephone interview with Geno Borchardt, Lead Counsel for Plaintiff, Barley (2000).
10s Spread Sheet, supra note 106 (indicating that zero RVUs were assigned for chest-x-
rays and ECGs, while RVUs were assigned for Committee Memberships and NTSP Board
Membership).
09 See Correll v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., No. 48-173889-98 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 27,
1998).
"I See Plaintiffs' First Amended Petition at 8-14, Correll (No. 48-173889-98) (detailing
decedent's ordeal with inflammatory bowel disease and systematic neglect by several
doctors).
I ld. at 21-22.
112 Telephone interview with Geno Borchardt, Lead Counsel for Plaintiff, Correll (n.d.).
113 See Witten, supra note 10, at 467-68 (describing various state approaches to requiring
licenses for PHOs).
114 See Overbay & Hall, supra note 9, at 376-77 (explaining the differences for licensing
purposes between provider groups and HMOs).
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as the upstream contracting HMO is licensed, the downstream entity usually
need not be licensed."
15
States employ a variety of strategies to deal with the issue of regulating
downstream risk.1 16 To understand the various state approaches, it is useful to
consider several proposed analytical frameworks to structure this complex
problem. One simple approach is "direct contracting" versus "downstream-
risk arrangements."' 17 When direct risk is involved, the presumption is that the
entity should be directly regulated." 18 When downstream risk is involved, the
presumption is that the state will regulate the contracting HMO, which, in turn,
is responsible for supervising the behaviors and financial solvency of the
downstream subcontractor. 19
The most influential treatise on the regulation of downstream risk has been
the 1997 National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (the "NAIC")
White Paper, The Regulation of Health Risk-Bearing Entities. 120 That paper
defined "downstream risk arrangements" as "contractual agreements between
licensed insurers, such as HMOs, and subcontracting provider entities
(organizations or individuals) that involve the provider entity assuming part of
the licensed entity's risk.' 121 The NAIC observed that there was widespread
agreement that physician service organizations that accept downstream risk
"should not be subject to licensure requirements that are as strict as those
imposed on HMOs."'122 According to the NAIC's view, entities that accept
direct risk, however, should be licensed. 123 At the time the NAIC paper was
published, states were divided as to whether the licensed entity should be held
115 See infra text accompanying note 122.
116 See NAT'L Assoc. OF INS. COMM'RS, DOWNSTREAM RISK CHART: CALIFORNIA,
COLORADO, NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK, AND MARYLAND (2001) (on file with author) (giving
comparison charts from these states on subjects of (1) how downstream-risk entities are
defined; (2) how downstream-risk entities are regulated; (3) "pay twice" provisions; (4) how
financial information about downstream-risk entities is reported to the Department of
Insurance; (5) how the Department of Insurance is able to audit the downstream-risk entity
directly; (6) mechanisms of enforcement; and (7) provisions for addressing continuity of
care); see also Witten, supra note 10, at 467-74.
117 NAIC DRAFT WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 81, 85 (comparing direct-contracting
with downstream-risk arrangements). "Direct-contracting arrangements involve agreements
between the risk-bearing entity and individuals, employers, or other unlicensed groups.
These arrangements may involve full or partial risk assumption." Id. at 81. "Downstream-
risk arrangements are contracted agreements between licensed insurers, such as HMOs, and
subcontracting provider entities (organizations or individuals) that involve the provider
entity's assuming part of the licensed entity's risk." Id. at 85.
''I Id. at 82.




23 Id. at 82.
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responsible for the actions of the downstream entity, as they still are. 124
A new treatise, Downstream Risk & Delegation, presented by the National
Association of Managed Care Regulators ("NAMCR"), 125 is likely to become
quite influential on the issue of regulating downstream risk. The NAMCR
believes that:
[T]he Managed Care Organization (MCO), as licensed entity, shall be
ultimately responsible in all aspects regardless of how the delivery of,
and payment for, care is subcontracted or shared or how many levels of
subcontracting are involved. The only exception to this would be where
the subcontractor was licensed by the State, thereby sharing some
responsibility with the MCO .... Statutes and regulations should make
this point very clear and uncontestable.1
26
The NAMCR warns that even if subcontracting arrangements do not appear to
transfer medical financial risk, regulators must be careful to look for excessive
administrative fees that create a "de facto transfer of risk. 1' 27 In all cases, it
recommends "swift, effective, and proactive corrective action" to ensure the
protection of the insureds.1
28
II. REGULATION OF DOWNSTREAM ENTITIES IN TEXAS
At the time the AVC was promulgated, the regulation of downstream
entities in Texas mirrored the national approach to such regulation.
Downstream entities that accepted risk from a licensed HMO were not required
to obtain any license as an HMO or any other certification related to accepting
such risk.129  The TDI was only given the indirect power to regulate
downstream entities through the licensed HMO with which they contracted and
through the licenses that such entities held related to their claims processing
124 Id. at 82-85.
125 NAMCR, DOWNSTREAM RISK & DELEGATION (June 1, 2001).
126 Id. at 46.
127 Id. at 49.
128 Id
129 Downstream entities that provide, for example, only physician services do not fall
under the purview of the HMO Act. See TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 20A.26(f) (West Supp.
2003) (defining physicians and providers who are "engaged in the delivery of health care
services" as not falling under the HMO Act). This caveat generally applies to those
provider entities, such as physician groups, that do not take on global risk. The Texas HMO
Act also does not apply to one particular entity that can take on global risk from an HMO,
namely, the Approved Nonprofit Health Corporation ("ANHC") organized pursuant to
section 162.001 of the Texas Occupations Code. The ANHC is not required to obtain a
certificate of authority from the TDI if it accepts risk from an HMO. See id. § 21.52F. The
ANHC has been the subject of much controversy in Texas because of the ability of these
organizations to be owned by a hospital, thereby raising fears of an "end run" around the
long-standing Texas ban on the corporate practice of medicine.
[Vol. 83:553
FINANCIAL RISK SHIFTING BY MANAGED CARE
and utilization-review functions.' 30 Although Texas law prohibited HMOs
from using compensation arrangements that induced physicians to limit
medically necessary services, 131 the Texas regulatory structure did not clearly
give the TDI the means by which to monitor this provision. Likewise, there
was no way for the TDI to monitor the solvency of downstream entities in
Texas.
At the time that the OAG entered into the AVC with Aetna, the TDI's
regulation of downstream entities was governed by article 20A.18C of the
Texas Insurance Code, effective during the fall of 1999.132 According to this
article, an agreement between an HMO and its delegated networks had to be in
writing, with a copy of the contract provided to the TDI.133 The TDI, however,
did not have to approve the contract before it became effective. 34 Some in the
TDI felt that the department did not have the staff or the monetary support to
review contracts between HMOs and their delegated networks before contracts
were ratified.'
35
Under the Texas regulatory scheme, the HMO essentially assumed the
responsibility for monitoring how its delegated network lived up to the
agreements with the HMO. This was provided by written information about
monitoring, financial performance, compliance with statutory Third Party
Administrator performance, and utilization-review performance, among
others.' 36 The delegated network was required to acknowledge that the HMO
was obliged to maintain a delivery system, a quality-assurance system, a
credentialing system, and all other systems to meet the statutory requirement of
the Texas HMO Act. 137 The HMO was required to provide the delegated
network with "detailed risk-pool data" and other data about "the percent of
premium attributable to hospital or facility costs.' 138 The HMO also had to
130 Id. §§ 20A.18C, 21.07-6, 21.58A (Vernon 2000) (defining, respectively, the
delegation of certain functions by HMOs, third-party administrators, and health care
utilization review agents).
1I Id. § 20A.14(/) (prohibiting HMOs from utilizing "any financial inducement" that
"acts directly or indirectly" to limit services).
132 Id. § 20A. 18C (laying out the scope of the TDI's regulatory authority over HMOs that
have delegated any functions to a downstream entity).
133 Id. § 20A. I 8C(a) (requiring HMOs to file any written agreement with the TDI within
thirty days of the agreement's execution).
134 Id. (detailing the provisions and summaries required in a written agreement, while not
expressly delegating any approval power to the TDI).
135 Telephone interview with Barbara Halthaus, Staff Attorney, Director of Special
Projects, Texas Department of Insurance (Mar. 28, 2001) (notes on file with author)
(speaking for herself and noting that her comments are not the official position of the TDI).
136 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.18C(a) (Vernon 2000) (detailing the requirements for a
written agreement between an HMO and its delegated networks).
131 Id. § 20A.18C(a)( 11)(A)(i) (listing one of the requirements for a written agreement
between an HMO and a delegated network).
138 Id. § 20A.18C(c).
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take action, in writing, to correct any delegated network's poor performance as
well as notify the TDI if a network failed to take timely action to correct
deficiencies. 39 After receiving a request for intervention from an HMO, the
TDI could conduct an audit 40 of the network or suspend the network's TPA or
Utilization Review license.' 4' The TDI could then request that a delegated
network take corrective actions to ensure compliance with the HMO Act.
142
Individual physicians were exempted from regulation by article 20.18C, as
were ANHCs, which were classified as physicians even though they took on
global risk from HMOs.1
43
The statutorily-required contract provisions applied only to the first layer of
downstream risk.' 44 Arrangements between the delegated network and other
downstream entities and individual physicians were largely not covered by the
statute. Specifically, it was not clear whether the TDI had authority to review
the financial arrangements between delegated entities and downstream
providers. 145 Thus, it was not clear whether the TDI could even review the
139 Id. § 20A. 18C(d) (requiring HMOs to act when "aware" that a delegated entity is "not
operating in accordance with its written agreement" or if the entity's continuing operation is
"hazardous to enrollee§").
140 Id. § 20A.18C(g) (granting the TDI the power to "examine the matters contained in
the notice as well as any other matter relating to the financial solvency of the delegated
entity").
"' Id. § 20A.18C(n) (giving the commissioner the authority to "suspend or revoke the
license of any third party administrator or utilization review agent that fails to comply with
[Article 20A. I 8C]").
142 Id. § 20A.18C(l) (listing the corrective actions that the TDI can request, including
reassuming the functions of the delegated entity, temporarily or permanently ceasing
assignments of new enrollees, and, in extreme cases, terminating the contract with the
delegated entity).
143 See supra note 129.
144 Telephone interview with Barbara Halthaus, supra note 135.
145 See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.18C(a)(12) (Vernon 2000) (providing that the HMO
must include in its contract with the delegated network a requirement that the delegated
network would provide samples of its contracts with physicians). The HMO, however,
"may not require that the delegated entity make available to the health maintenance
organization contractual provisions relating to financial arrangements with the delegated
entity's physicians and providers." Id. The effect of this would be that the HMO would not
have access to the specific financial arrangements that could be inducing physicians to
withhold medically necessary services. The statute provided that the TDI could "request
financial and operational documents from the delegated network." The TDI, however,
could request this information only after the HMO's request for the TDI's intervention. Id.
§ 20A. I 8C(g) (giving the TDI power to request information after a receipt of notice under
subsection (d) of Article 20A. 18C). The TDI had authority to directly obtain copies of
contracts between an HMO and any physician with whom the HMO had a contract, but this
does not appear to apply to contracts between a delegated entity and a physician. See id. §
20A.17 (examinations). This authority was subsequently explicitly granted by HB 2828
passed by the Texas Legislature on May 17, 2001. HB 2828 amended article 20A.18C(a)(6)
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very financial incentives and arrangements that could lead physicians and other
providers to withhold medically necessary care.
Most observers, including, most important, the TDI itself, felt that the
regulations in place at the time the OAG entered into the AVC were weak.
146
The TDI felt that the statute limited possible action against network providers
after an HMO complained about non-compliance to a reactive position. 47 It is
important to note that in 2001, after the AVC had been implemented, the Texas
Insurance Commissioner asked the Texas Legislature to hold HMOs one-
hundred percent financially accountable for any downstream financial
failures.14 8 The Commissioner also requested authority to investigate potential
downstream network problems, "without waiting to be notified by the
HMO."' 149 Note that the Texas Insurance Code provided that an HMO was
responsible for the viability of its network.' 50 What seemed to be missing in
the regulatory understanding was that, notwithstanding any statutorily
permissible delegation of duties by an HMO, HMOs remained ultimately
responsible for the acts and financial condition of their downstream entities.
An example of this uncertainty concerning an HMO's ultimate
responsibility was the enforcement of prompt payment of providers. The
Texas Insurance Code required HMOs to make payment to providers within
forty-five days.'51 Prompt pay to physicians was an important political issue in
to provide that the contract between the HMO and the delegated entity must include
a provision that requires the delegated entity to permit the commissioner to examine at
any time any information the commissioner reasonably believes is relevant to... the
ability of the delegated entity to meet the entity's responsibilities in connection with
any function delegated to the entity by the health maintenance organization.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A. 1 8C(a)(6)(B) (West Supp. 2003).
146 Letter from Jos6 Montemayor, Commissioner of Insurance, State of Texas, to Connie
M. Barron, Associate Director, Legislative Affairs, Texas Medical Association (Feb. 27,
2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Montemayor Letter]; see also Telephone interview
with Barbara Halthaus, supra note 135 (commenting that the Insurance Code regulations in
effect at the time of the AVC had "no teeth").
4 Telephone interview with Barbara Halthaus, supra note 135.
148 See Montemayor Letter, supra note 146.
149 Id.
150 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.05(a)(1)(A) (Vernon 2000) (holding out as a requirement
for obtaining a certificate of authority that the HMO applicant demonstrate the willingness
and potential ability to assure that "health care services will be provided in a manner to
assure both availability and accessibility of adequate personnel and facilities, in a manner
enhancing availability, accessibility, and continuity of services"). Failure to meet these
requirements can result in suspension or revocation of the HMO's license. Id. §
20A.20(a)(4). In addition, the Texas Insurance Code provided that any delegation
agreement must include a provision stating that "the delegation agreement may not be
construed to limit in any way the health maintenance organization's authority or
responsibility, including financial responsibility, to comply with all statutory and regulatory
requirements." Id. § 20A.18C(a)(4).
15' Id. § 20A.18B(c) (West 2000) (setting out how HMOs make total and portion
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Texas and many other states at the time the AVC was promulgated. 152 While a
thorough discussion of prompt-pay issues is beyond the scope of this Article, it
is important to note that the Texas Insurance Commissioner, in a letter to the
TMA, identified slow payment by delegated networks to providers as a
significant problem. 153 The Commissioner did not have any clear authority to
control the process of claims paying by delegated networks and entities other
than through their TPA license.1
54
Thus, it appears that at both the national level and in Texas, the relationship
between downstream entities and the ultimate providers of care was largely
unregulated at the time that the OAG filed suit against the HMOs. This
situation allowed HMOs to do business without due regard for the actions of
downstream providers, possibly resulting in the withholding of medically
necessary care. In addition, without a concept of the HMOs' ultimate
responsibility for the financial condition of the downstream entities, the HMOs
could operate without any regard for the financial solvency of those entities.
This represented a major cost-shifting opportunity for HMOs, allowing them to
continue to pose as meaningful participants in the system of health-care
financing in the United States. The OAG's lawsuit and the AVC that resulted
payments to physicians and providers).
152 See Trebor Banstetter, Doctors Up In Arms Over Tardy Fee; Hospital and Physicians
Will Ask the State to Crack Down on Insurers Who Fail to Pay On Time, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Feb. 18, 2001, at BI (reporting that doctors in Texas are frustrated over
the late payment of submitted insurance claims in spite of a state law requiring valid claims
be paid within forty-five days); see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.18B (West 2000 &
Supp. 2003) (defining payments from HMOs to physicians or providers as completed or
"clean" claims); Proposed legislation, C.S.H.B. 1862 (Tex. April 2, 2001) (amending the
current statute to establish a standardized clean-claim form for health care plan providers,
setting forth provisions for the receipt of a claim by a health care provider, making it an
unfair or deceptive act for an insurer to fail "to make a payment or otherwise act in good
faith with respect to services for which coverage is reasonably clear under the health benefit
plan," and detailing other deceptive practices regarding failure to pay bills promptly); D.
Ted Lewers, Keeping the Fires Lit on Issue of Prompt Payment, 44 AM. MED. NEws, Apr. 2,
2001, at 29; Illinois Dep't of Ins., Illinois Insurance Facts Prompt Pay Law, available at
http://www.ins.state.il.us/HealthInsurance/PromptPay.htm (last modified Mar. 27, 2003)
(noting that there are separate prompt-pay requirements for IPAs and PHOs). For IPAs and
PHOs, the Illinois Prompt-Pay law grants specific authority to the Illinois Department of
Insurance for enforcement of this law. The Department anticipates it will adopt the rules for
the enforcement of the Prompt-Pay Law in relation to IPAs and PHOs.
153 See Montemayor Letter, supra note 146.
54 The current Texas Prompt-Pay Law does not contain language that is as specific as
the interpretation by the Illinois Department of Insurance of that state's prompt-pay law.
See Illinois Dep't of Ins., supra note 152. In Texas, the insurance code does not apply to a
capitation payment made to a physician or provider but does apply to a "person with whom
a health maintenance organization contracts to pr.ocess claims or to obtain the services of
physicians and providers to provide health care services to health care plan enrollees." TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. § 28.18B (Vernon 2000).
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from that lawsuit reflect a rising consciousness that HMOs should not be
allowed to shift to others their cost of doing business. It is in this context that
one must evaluate the AVC.
III. THE ASSURANCE OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. Introduction
In December 1998, then-Texas Attorney General Dan Morales filed suit
against six HMOs for violations of the Texas Insurance Code,' 55 the Texas
Administrative Code, 156 and the Texas DTPA.' 57 The suit accused the HMOs
of illegally using financial incentives to induce physicians to limit medically
necessary care to HMO members 158 and not disclosing to consumers these
perverse financial incentives. 59 The OAG ultimately arrived at a settlement
with only the Aetna defendants on April 11, 2000.160 The settlement is
reflected in a document known as the "Assurance of Voluntary
Compliance."' 6' The AVC represents an attempt to control Aetna's use of
downstream risk. In evaluating the AVC's attempt to regulate the HMO's
ability to shift financial risk to downstream entities, it is important to keep in
mind the regulatory structure in Texas at the time the AVC was negotiated. It
is clear that Texas law prohibited financial inducements to limit necessary
care; however, that same insurance law did not clearly give the TDI the
regulatory authority to obtain the information that was necessary to enforce
this law.
The OAG alleged that the HMOs had employed incentives like "shared risk
funds," whereby costs for particular services, such as hospital admissions, were
estimated by the HMO and then physicians were financially penalized if actual
costs exceeded the HMO's projected costs. 162 Other incentives were "bonus"
155 See Plaintiff's Petition, Aetna, supra note 22 and sources cited therein; see also TEX.
INS. CODE. ANN. § 20A. 14() (West 2000) ("A health maintenance organization may not use
any financial incentive or make any payment to a physician or provider that acts directly or
indirectly as an inducement to limit medically necessary services ... .
156 18 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 21.103(d), 21.105(c) (West 2000).
157 See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 17.46(a), (b)(23) (West 2000) (stating that failing to
disclose to HMO members the existence or possible effect of financial-incentive
arrangements, as well as failing to disclose to members that physicians may suffer penalties
if they candidly talk with their patients would fall under the section 17.46(a) prohibition of
"false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce,"
where subsection (b)(23) defines "false, misleading, or deceptive" to include "filing suit
upon written contractual obligations" with the physicians in question).
158 Plaintiffs Petition, Aetna, supra note 22, at 1.2.
151 Id. at 1.5.
160 AVC, Aetna, supra note 24.
161 Id.
162 Plaintiff's Petition, Aetna, supra note 22, at 9.4, 9.5, 9.9.
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arrangements which paid physicians more based on fewer services rendered to
consumers. 163 The OAG characterized these incentives as attempts to "limit
treatment to members in order to maximize profits."'1 64 The AVC addressed
these matters in a comprehensive fashion.
B. The A VC's Approach to Downstream Risk Contracts
Section II of the AVC is entitled, "Improving the Quality and Integrity of
the Physician-Patient Relationship."'' 65  In subsection A of Section II,
"Capitation and Other Financial Incentive Arrangements," Aetna agreed:
1. Not to use any financial incentives to penalize individual physicians
and primary care provider groups for "exceeding certain budgets,"'166 or
for "incurring expenses that are medically necessary."'
1 67
2. To use contracts that "will not be affected by the actual (as opposed to
projected) costs of services incurred by Aetna or by the actual rate of
utilization of services during that contract year. ."... ,168 Thus, the AVC
permitted payment arrangements based on projected utilization, such as
capitation, but barred payment arrangements based on actual utilization,
such as withholds or downside-risk sharing.'
69
3. To only use financial incentive arrangements that are "actuarially
sound" in all risk-transfer arrangements, including those between
network providers and downstream entities. 170 The actuary used by
Aetna must be certified,17' and the actuary's certification of the
arrangement must show that the arrangements are appropriate to cover
all of the medically necessary services for which the provider was
responsible. 172
4. Not to engage in risk transfer without assuring that there is stop-loss
163 Id. at 9.6-9.7.
164 Id. at 9.7.
165 AVC, Aetna, supra note 24, § I1.
166 Id. § ll.A.2(a).
167 Id.
6 Id. § Il.A.2(b).
169 See supra notes 162-64 (discussing the financial arrangements with which the OAG
took issue in State v. Aetna). A common theme in such arrangements was that the
physicians would be rewarded if their actual costs were under projected costs, and they
would be punished if actual costs exceeded projected costs.
170 AVC, Aetna, supra note 24, § II.A.3.
' Id. (deeming an actuary "certified" if the actuary is "knowledgeable regarding
Physician and Health Care Provider compensation" and is a member of the American
Academy of Actuaries or a fellow of the Society of Actuaries).
172 Id. (stating that an actuary must certify that a formula or method of calculating
soundness of the arrangement is "based on reasonable assumptions, actuarially sufficient to
compensate the Network Provider for the risk being assumed").
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insurance or reinsurance to prevent any network provider or
downstream contractor from bearing "extraordinary costs.
1 73
5. To allow individual physicians and small primary care physician groups
to choose whether to be paid by capitation or a fee-for-service schedule,
particularly for those with groups of fewer than one hundred
enrollees. 174
The AVC also requires that all financial incentives be "clearly and
unambiguously disclosed in contracts" with providers at all levels
downstream.1 75 Furthermore, the AVC requires that any financial incentives
be. disclosed to consumers in their member handbook.
76
Section I.B of the AVC deals with economic profiling of providers by the
HMO.177 The AVC prohibits HMOs from terminating or penalizing a provider
for providing, or proposing to provide, medically necessary care by a variety of
statistical and professional methodologies.1 78  All profiling must be by
objective peer review and directly related to quality. 179 The terms of section
II.B fully apply to downstream providers. 80  Aetna also agreed not to
discriminate against any enrollee because of a life-threatening or disabling
condition' 8' and agreed to screen for "[c]linically [i]nappropriate
[u]nderutilization of health care." 182  The AVC prohibits Aetna from
unilaterally amending a capitation rate or fee schedule for individual
physicians or small groups without written notice,1 83 and it prevents Aetna
from retroactively amending contracts for other providers, "except as
specifically otherwise agreed to within the contract."
184
To the extent that the above-referenced provisions concern Aetna's direct
113 Id. § II.A.4.
114 Id. § ll.A.5(a) (detailing how a "directly contracted Individual primary care physician
or directly contracted Primary Care Physician Group" can opt for fee-for-service payment
instead of capitation payment).
175 Id. § II.A.8.
.76 Id. § II.A.9 (detailing, specifically, the language Aetna must use to make such
disclosures).
177 Id. § ll.B.
171 Id. § II.B.1 (defining statistical and professional methodologies as "(a) projected; (b)
the statistical norm; (c) provided or proposed to be provided by peers; or (d) established as a
goal").
"I9 Id. § II.B.2 (indicating that Aetna also agreed not to use economic profiling to
discourage providers from providing medically necessary care to patients).
I Id. § lI.B.5 (requiring that Aetna must contractually require all its downstream
providers to implement sections II.B(l)-(4) of the AVC in their contracts with other
downstream entities).
181 Id. § II.B.4.
182 Id. § II.B.8.
183 Id. § II.C.9 (requiring ninety days written notice for a payment method change).
84 Id. § II.C.10.
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contracts with individual providers or provider groups, they are not
remarkable. In the case of direct contracts between Aetna and any entity, there
was adequate statutory basis under Texas Insurance Code article 20A.14(l)(1)
for prohibiting arrangements that induce physicians to withhold medically
necessary services. 85  In fact, the TDI had previously exercised similar
authority in dealing with a licensed entity that the TDI believed to be entering
into direct contracts with physicians, in violation of Texas Insurance Code
article 20A. 14(1).
On April 1, 1998, the TDI issued a report charging Harris Methodist HMO
("Harris"), a licensed HMO, with using financial incentives that penalized
doctors for providing medically necessary care.' 86 On August 18, 1998, Harris
signed a consent order with the TDI including findings of fact that Harris had
put primary care physicians ("PCPs") into risk pools for pharmacy benefits,
hospital inpatient, and specialist referrals. 87 According to the findings of fact,
Harris had ranked PCPs into five tiers based on medical expenses, and the
PCPs' payments had been adjusted according to the deviation between the
actual expenses and the budgeted expenses. ' 88 Amounts withheld from the risk
pools were as high as fifty percent.'89 Pharmacy risk pools had a penalty of as
much as thirty-five percent and a bonus potential of forty-nine percent. 90
Capitation rates were adjusted according to economic performance, with no-
bonuses-upward adjustment for the lower three tiers.' 9' In the consent
agreement with the TDI, Harris agreed to pay over $2 million to the PCPs,
which had been taken out of their pay due to pharmacy benefit overruns, and
almost $800,000 in bonuses that had been withheld. 192 Harris also agreed to
cease ranking physicians based on economic performance, to limit bonuses
based on performance to no more than ten percent of base-rate compensation,
and to base any such bonuses on appropriate quality measures. 93 Furthermore,
Harris agreed that PCPs with fewer than 500 enrollees and medical groups
with fewer than 1,000 enrollees could not receive bonuses based upon
economic performance. 94 The TDI's regulatory action resulted in dramatic
185 TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.14() (Vernon 1997) ("A health maintenance organization
may not use any financial incentive or make any payment to a physician or provider that
acts directly or indirectly as an inducement to limit medically necessary services.").
186 See Harris Methodist Tex. Health Plan, Inc., Official Consent Order No. 98-0975
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changes in Harris's use of financial incentives in physician contracts.195
What the episode with Harris revealed was that, when dealing with direct
contracts, the Texas Insurance Code provided the TDI with a sufficient basis
for regulating financial risk shifting. However, in the AVC, the OAG
attempted to reach beyond these first-tier contracts between a licensed HMO
and its direct downstream contractor. The AVC also addresses the relationship
between Aetna's unlicensed downstream entities and the individual providers
with whom the downstream entities contract. 96 As stated before, the TDI's
statutory authority to accomplish this was uncertain.
1 97
The OAG had more tools at its disposal than the TDI. In particular, the
OAG filed its lawsuit on behalf of the consumers of the State of Texas.' 98 Its
statutory authority for consumer protection gave it more sweeping powers than
those possessed by the TDI.199 In addition, because the OAG filed a lawsuit, it
could demand from the HMOs any evidence that was relevant to the lawsuit.
200
195 Id.
196 AVC, Aetna, supra note 24, § II.A.6 (stating that "Aetna agrees that it will
contractually require all Risk Bearing Network Providers to implement the conditions
agreed to by Aetna in this [section] in the Risk Bearing Network Provider's Down stream
Contracts with other Network Providers").
"I See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
'9' See Plaintiff's Petition, Aetna, supra note 22, at 1-2.
199 The lawsuit alleged violations of the Texas DTPA. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41-17.80 (Vernon 1997). By invoking this law, the OAG was acting in a capacity that
was in addition to its capacity as the attorney for the TDI. The Texas DTPA provides that
the Consumer Protection Division of the OAG has the power to file a cause of action to
restrain deceptive trade practices and to seek civil monetary penalties for such practices if
such a cause of action is in the public interest. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.47(a)-
(d) (Vernon 1997) (granting the OAG power to bring an action against any person that "the
consumer protection division has reason to believe ... is engaging in, has engaged in, or is
about to engage in any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this subchapter," and
providing for various remedies and penalties, including damages and restitution). In the
Complaint, the Attorney General alleged that the action was in the public interest.
Plaintiff's Petition, Aetna, supra note 22, pt. IV. Even in the absence of a lawsuit, the
Attorney General had the power to investigate violations of the Texas DTPA. TEX. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.60 (Vernon 1991) (granting the OAG the power to investigate
potential violations by (1) requiring statements by the accused concerning the event in
question, (2) examining witnesses under oath, and (3) examining merchandise deemed
necessary and proper). The Attorney General could also issue Civil Investigative Demands
for any documentary material relevant to the subject matter of such an investigation. Id. §
17.61. In addition, the AVC itself is a creature of the Texas DTPA. See id. § 17.58(a)
(granting the Attorney General authority to accept assurance of voluntary compliance with
respect to any act or practice which violates the Texas DTPA).
200 Under the Texas Rules of Civil Discovery, "[a] party may obtain discovery regarding
any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action."
TEX. R. Civ. Disc. 192.3(a), cited in Order in Misc. Docket 98-9196, Nov. 9, 1998,
reprinted in 61 TEX. B.J. 1140, 1147-48 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter Nov. 9 Order]. Note the
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Thus, the OAG had the ability to demand the very financial information that
the TDI wanted but was uncertain it could obtain.
The OAG used its additional power to negotiate provisions in the AVC
clarifying that a licensed HMO bears the responsibility for the activities of its
downstream contractors. Thus, the AVC makes Aetna responsible for ensuring
that the financial prohibitions in the AVC are also included in its downstream
contracts with other network providers. 20' Under the AVC, if a network
provider does not implement these financial incentive provisions, then Aetna
has the responsibility to report that information to the OAG. 20 2
The AVC also makes clear that Aetna could not absolve itself from
responsibility for maintaining a network in the event that one of its
downstream contractors suffered a financial collapse. Section II.D of the AVC
specifies that Aetna must assure continuity of care in case of the failure of a
risk-bearing network provider by contracting directly with the downstream
providers or reporting to the OAG those who refuse to do so.203 If a risk-
bearing entity fails, Aetna can make payments directly to the downstream
provider without being subject to any injunctive relief 204
Section V.6 of the AVC directs Aetna to identify to the OAG the network
providers that refuse to contractually commit to any of the six specifically
enumerated AVC provisions relating to the use of financial incentives. 20 5
contrast to the scope of discovery in litigation versus the uncertainty surrounding the TDI's
authority to obtain financial information under the Texas Insurance Code. See supra notes
144-47 and accompanying text. Such financial relationships may have been privileged as
"trade secrets"; however, the privilege would be overcome if its allowance would conceal
fraud or otherwise work an injustice. See TEX. R. EvID. 507. In this litigation, it was the
very nature of the financial relationships that was the basis of the lawsuits. In addition, a
judge may institute protective measures to protect trade secrets from unnecessary disclosure
"as the interests of the holder of the privilege and of the parties and the furtherance of
justice may require." Id.
201 AVC, Aetna, supra note 24, § l.A.2(c) (stating that Aetna will "contractually require
all Network Providers to implement the conditions agreed to by Aetna in [this section] in the
Network Providers' Downstream Contracts with other Network Providers").
202 Id. § ll.A.2(d) ("[l]f a Network Provider refuses to contractually commit to
implement the provisions of [this section] ... then Aetna ... shall report the identity of that
Network Provider to the Attorney General.").
203 Id. § II.D.1 (stating that Aetna must include in all contracts a provision to maintain
continuity of care to its members if the other contracting party is unable to do so).
204 Id. § ll.D.2 (stating that Aetna's contracts must also require "Risk Bearing Network
Provider[s] to agree not to seek... any injunctive relief prohibiting Aetna from making
direct payments to the participating Network Providers" if and when the Risk Bearing
Network provider cannot make a timely payment).
205 These are:
[(I)] [T]he prohibition against utilization based compensation as specified in Section
ll.A.2(b), (c) and (d) of this AVC; [(2)] the requirement for stop loss insurance or
similar measures as specified in Section II.A.4 of this AVC; [(3)] the option to be paid
per office visit as specified in Section lI.A.5(a) of this AVC; [(4)] the prohibition
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These are non-mandatory exceptions requiring a good-faith effort to comply,
whereas all of the other AVC provisions relating to downstream entities are
mandatory.20 6 Aetna also agreed to abstain from contracting with any network
provider that refuses to implement the AVC 20 7 and to "obtain certification"
demonstrating that each network provider is in compliance with the AVC.20 8
For those providers not in compliance, Aetna agreed to take corrective
action.
209
The AVC was important for a number of reasons. It clarified the HMOs'
ultimate responsibility for the effects of their downstream contractors'
activities. It provided some detail on the prohibition against financial
incentives that could induce physicians to withhold medically necessary
services. Finally, it delivered the message that there was a new regulatory
approach on the horizon, bringing to a close the implicit subsidy created by the
past governmental tolerance of HMO risk-shifting activity.
The AVC appeared to set the stage for a new era of managed care regulation
in Texas. Subsequent to the execution of the AVC, the Texas Legislature, the
TDI, and the OAG took steps to emphasize a renewed focus on the ultimate
responsibility of HMOs in Texas. In the spring of 2001, the Texas Legislature
passed House Bill 2828, which gives the Texas Commissioner of Insurance
more power to monitor the solvency and performance of downstream
contractors. 210 Among other things, HB 2828 allows the Commissioner of
against compensating an Individual Physician through a Financial Incentive
Arrangement for services provided by others as specified in Section II.A.6 of this
AVC; [(5)] the requirement that Network Providers implement effective preventive
care programs as specified in Section II.A.7 of this AVC; and [(6)] the requirement that
services provided pursuant to a financial incentive agreement be clearly and
unambiguously disclosed as specified in Section II.A.8 of this AVC.
Id. § V.6.
206 Telephone interview with Robert C. Robinson IIl, Assistant Attorney General, State
of Texas (Apr. 30, 2001) (notes on file with author).
207 AVC, Aetna, supra note 24, § V.6 ("Aetna agrees that it will not contract with any
Network Provider that refuses to contractually commit to implement any agreements that
Aetna is required by this AVC to obtain from Network Providers.").
208 id. § V.7 (stating that Aetna must use its "best efforts" to make sure that Network
Providers are in compliance with "Aetna's standards, this AVC, and applicable law").
209 Id. ("Aetna agrees to take corrective action, as necessary, to ensure that each Network
Provider complies with Aetna's standards, this AVC, and applicable law.").
210 See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.18C(a)(6) (Vernon 2001), as amended by HB 2828
(requiring HMOs to include in their contracts with delegated entities a provision that
requires the delegated entity to permit the Commissioner of Insurance to examine at any
time any information the commissioner reasonably believes is relevant to the financial
solvency of the delegated entity and the delegated entity's ability to perform its
responsibilities in connection with functions delegated by the HMO). As amended by HB
2828, section 20A.18C(g), gives the Commissioner of Insurance authority to examine
matters related to the delegated entity's financial solvency and ability to meet its obligations
for delegated responsibilities. Id. § 20A. I 8C(g).
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Insurance to:
[O]rder the health maintenance organization to take any action the
Commissioner determines is necessary to ensure that the health
maintenance organization is in compliance with [the HMO Act],
including ... reassuming the functions delegated to the delegated entity,
including claims payments for services previously rendered to enrollees
of the health maintenance organization.
2 11
HB 2828 explicitly adopts reserve requirements for "delegated networks,"
defined as downstream entities that "assume total financial risk for one of the
following categories of health care services: medical care, hospital or other
institutional services, or prescription drugs.
'212
Since the execution of the AVC, the TDI has also entered into consent
orders with HMOs pursuant to which the HMOs were financially liable for
their delegated entities' failure to pay certain claims owed to physicians and
other providers. 21 3 In recent litigation filed against PacifiCare of Texas, Inc.,
in February 2002, the OAG has returned to the theme of ultimate financial
responsibility for the licensed HMO. 214 The lawsuit seeks to hold the HMO
financially responsible for the failure of its downstream entities to fulfill the
requirements of Texas prompt-pay statutes. 2 15 In this lawsuit, the OAG asserts
211 Id. § 20A.I8C()(l).
212 Id. §§ 20A. I 8D, 20A.02(ff) (requiring "delegated networks" to establish and maintain
reserves adequate to cover the liabilities and risks assumed by the network). It should be
noted that the term "delegated network" does not include a delegated entity that shares risk
for a category of services with a health maintenance organization. Id. § 20A.02(ff). A
"delegated entity" is any entity "other than a health maintenance organization ... that by
itself, or through subcontracts with one or more entities, undertakes to arrange for or to
provide medical or health care to an enrollee in exchange for a predetermined payment on a
prospective basis and that accepts responsibility to perform on behalf of the health
maintenance organization any function regulated by [the Texas HMO] Act." Id §
20A.02(ee). The term "delegated entity" does not include "an individual physician or a
group of employed physicians practicing medicine under one federal tax identification
number and whose total claims paid to [non-employee providers] is less than 20 percent of
the total collected revenue of the group." Id.
213 See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Ins., Aetna Consent Order Summary, at http://www.tdi.state.tx
.us/consumer/nrl 101 lb.html (accessed Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Aetna Consent Order].
In this consent order, Aetna was required to "use reasonable efforts to enforce contract
obligations of certain of its delegates" to pay claims of physicians and other providers. Id.
The delegates included several clinics, PPOs, and IPAs. In addition, upon the failure of the
delegates to pay the required amounts within sixty days, Aetna itself was required to make
payment. Id.
214 See Plaintiffs Complaint, State v. PacifiCare of Tex., Inc., No. GV200718 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Feb. 11, 2002).
215 Id. § X.C. According to the complaint:
PacifiCare paid its delegated networks a monthly capitation fee. The delegated
networks were contractually obligated to use this capitation fee to pay physicians and
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that the HMO is "statutorily prohibited from contractually relieving itself of
regulatory responsibility for.. .delegated functions" 216  and may not
contractually relieve itself of its responsibility to promptly pay claims in
compliance with Texas statutes and regulations.
21 7
C. Aetna's Corporate Performance Since the A VC
The AVC was a harbinger of a new regulatory approach to risk shifting by
HMOs. The AVC emphasized the ultimate responsibility of the HMO for
things that occurred downstream. This meant that this avenue of cost shifting
would no longer be available to Aetna in the State of Texas. The handwriting
was on the wall; Aetna would be required to bear the full cost of operating its
networks, and that necessarily meant that profits would decline for HMOs.
HMOs would need to find another avenue by which to achieve risk avoidance
if they wanted to remain significant players in the health care financing system
in the United States.
A national health care consulting firm urged its clients to view the AVC as
"a clear and concrete reminder that it is time to start focusing on new ways to
conduct their business if they are to remain competitive. 21 8 In light of the
AVC, Aetna began promoting a vision of a new corporate identity embodied in
the slogan, "The new Aetna: turning promise into practice. '21 9 At the same
time, however, Aetna embarked on a course of risk-shedding by pulling out of
certain markets. The actions that Aetna has taken subsequent to the AVC
support the proposition that removing the implicit subsidy provided to HMOs
providers for covered services provided to PacifiCare members. However, as a result
of PacifiCare's failure to properly manage, monitor, and oversee its networks,
physicians and providers who contracted with the delegated networks and cared for
PacifiCare's members were not paid by the delegated network.
Id. The complaint further asserts that:
PacifiCare's failure to assure that its delegated networks complied with its contract and
with regulatory requirements for prompt and proper payment to physicians and
providers resulted in many millions of dollars of physicians' and providers' claims left
unpaid when PacifiCare's delegated networks became insolvent .... PacifiCare is
responsible for its delegated network's failure to comply with the prompt-pay
laws ....
Id. § X.D.
216 Id. § VIII (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A.18C(a)(4) (Vernon 1997)). Section
20A.18C(a)(4) of the Texas Insurance Code provides that the health maintenance
organization's written agreement with a delegate must include a provision "that the
delegation agreement may not be construed to limit in any way the health maintenance
organization's authority or responsibility, including financial responsibility, to comply with
all statutory and regulatory requirements." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 20A. 1 8C(a)(4) (Vernon
1997).
217 Plaintiff's Complaint § IX.B, PacifiCare (No. GV200718) (citing TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. § 20A. 18C(a)(4) (Vernon 1997)).
218 Stordahl, supra note 27.
219 Aetna, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at A19.
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will cause them to withdraw from insurance markets.
On May 10, 2000, shortly after the announcement of the AVC, the then-
Aetna Chairman and CEO, William H. Donaldson, announced a new vision for
Aetna.220 He described a new business model based on a better partnership
with participating physicians. 221 Acknowledging the Texas AVC, Donaldson
warned that "[w]hile local-market issues make it difficult to apply the same
approach nationally, we are moving quickly to make sensible and thoughtful
improvements in other markets. 2 22 On December 19, 2000, Aetna announced
nationally that it was adopting a "more flexible physician contracting
strategy." 223  The stated reason for this policy change was to "improv[e]
physician relationships with the goal of improving health care quality.
224
Aetna noted ongoing discussions with the physicians in California,
Connecticut, Georgia, New Jersey, and Virginia.225 With respect to the Texas
AVC, Aetna said it was considering making some of those changes on a
"market-by-market" basis.226
Press accounts raised concerns that eliminating financial incentives for
doctors would affect an HMO's ability to hold down costs. 227 In fact, Aetna's
financial performance deteriorated throughout 2000 and 2001.228 After
announcing that profits would not meet expectations, Aetna saw its stock fall
220 See Press Release, Aetna United States Healthcare, Aetna Chairman William H.
Donaldson Speaks at Connecticut Medical Society Annual Meeting (May 10, 2000)
(announcing new changes to improve relationships with physicians and access to care for
patients), available at http://www.aetna.com/news/2000/prtpr 2000051 0B.htm (accessed
Feb. 28, 2003); see also William H. Donaldson, Aetna CEO, Address to Connecticut State
Medical Society (May 10, 2000) (sharing a vision of how to improve the relationship
between Connecticut doctors and Aetna), available at http://www.aetna.com/news/
2000/prtpr_2000051 0.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2003) (notes on file with author).
221 Press Release, supra note 220 (describing changes such as giving physicians the
flexibility to opt out of Aetna's all-products policy and allowing those physicians with fewer
than 100 HMO members to be paid on a fee-for-service basis).
222 Donaldson, supra note 220.
223 See Press Release, Aetna United States Healthcare, Aetna President CEO John W.
Rowe, M.D., Announces National Implementation of More Flexible Physician Contracting
Strategy (Dec. 19, 2000), available at http://www.aetna.com/news/2000/prtpr_
20001219.htm.
224 Id.
225 Id. (listing on-going changes in Florida, California, New Jersey, Georgia, Texas, and
Virginia).
226 Id.
227 See Diane Levick, Can Aetna Heal Itself?, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 22, 2001, at Al
(stating that the "kinder, gentler" Aetna has recently made concessions that may potentially
hurt its bottom line), available at http://www.ctnow.com.
228 See Joseph B. Treaster, Aetna Says First-Quarter Profit Will Fall Far Short of
Expectations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2001, at CI (announcing that Aetna's costs for 2000 and
2001 were much greater than originally projected).
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more than seventeen percent in one day.229 A longtime Wall Street HMO
analyst observed that Aetna "tried to become kinder and gentler so quickly that
it has led to a dramatic increase in their costs. '230 Indeed, Aetna announced
$90 million in unanticipated medical costs in the first quarter of 2001.231
Aetna suffered $12.3 million in losses in Texas in both of its HMO units in the
first three quarters of 2000.232 Hospital costs in Houston were up thirty
percent.233 This financial impact of the AVC and Aetna's new business was
entirely predictable. Financial risk shifting had granted HMOs a significant
implicit subsidy during the heyday of managed care. The threatened removal
of this subsidy affected the bottom line.
The reality that the implicit subsidy was no longer going to be a viable
option triggered a predictable response. Aetna began to reduce its risk by
pulling out of certain markets, including the more risky small business and
Medicare markets. Aetna's insured members dropped from twenty-one million
in 1999 to 19.3 million by December 31, 2000.234 In 2001, Aetna eliminated
one million enrollees in HMOs in which Aetna took financial risk for losses,
terming these "unprofitable," and continued in more profitable HMOs for self-
insured employers where the employer, and not Aetna, bore the financial
risk. 235 By April 2002, Aetna had shed another four million enrollees and now
had enrollment of fifteen million. 236 By April 2002, Aetna had become
profitable for the first quarter since December 2000.237 That profitability
extended through the second quarter, and its CEO observed, "I'm a believer in
cost sharing for consumers, to [giving them] some skin in the game, if you
will. '238 Having shed the risk of unprofitable, high-risk patients and risk-
229 Id. (stating that "[s]hares in Aetna... dropped more than 17 percent yesterday after
the company warned that its first-quarter earnings would be significantly lower than
expected").
230 See Treaster, supra note 28 (quoting Kenneth S. Abramowitz, a managing director at
the Carlyle Group).
231 Id. ("Aetna said it expected an additional $90 million in medical expenses for the first
quarter.").
232 John B. Harkey, Some Texas HMOs Cut Losses, 3 HARKEY REPORT-TEXAS
MANAGED CARE 2 (Feb. 2001).
233 Id.
234 See Levick, supra note 227 (stating that Aetna dropped from twenty-one million
members to 19.3 million members by December 31, 2000).
235 Milt Freudenheim, Aetna to Close Some Unprofitable H.M.O. 's, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
2001, at C5 ("Aetna plans to shed up to one million members of unprofitable health plans
this year.").
236 Milt Freudenheim, Aetna Health Care Unit Posts a Profit, Ending Its Drought, N.Y.
TiMEs, Apr. 26, 2002, at C6 (stating that Aetna was the nation's second-largest health
insurer with fifteen million members).
237 Id.
238 Aetna Posts Higher Profit, Raises Outlook, REUTERS, Aug. 1, 2001, available at
http://www.foxnews.com/printer-friendly-story/0,3566,59324,00.html.
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bearing HMOs, Aetna was transferring risk to its remaining 14.4 million HMO
enrollees and, in the process, becoming profitable.239  Due to this risk
shedding, however, Aetna was no longer the country's largest HMO.
240
CONCLUSION
Aetna's evolution subsequent to the AVC is not unlike the experience of
other HMOs during the same period as they anticipated the end of the risk-
shifting era. Around the country, HMOs began to withdraw from certain
markets, increase premiums in other markets, and introduce new products in
which the consumer is called upon to bear a greater responsibility for the risk.
The rise of so-called "defined contribution" plans is reflective of the fact that
the risk pea is being transferred to another player's pocket shell in the shell
game. Because governmental policy threatens to shut off all other avenues of
risk avoidance, under the new shell game, the consumer will be left bearing the
risk.
It appears that after having effectively held down cost increases for a
decade, managed care has begun to lose the ability to control such increases.
2 41
The close of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium have ushered
in the return of double-digit increases in the cost of health coverage.
242 It
seems that the price restraints that were in effect in the 1990s were merely
illusory. What appeared to be controlling costs was, in reality, the result of an
elaborate shell game. Managed care did not truly control the costs of health
care; it merely moved those costs to another side of the ledger by entering into
arrangements in which providers actually took on insurance risk. In effect,
managed care exported the costs of operating an insurance program to another
party in the health care system.
By imposing upon managed care the burden of the cost of insuring against
health expenditures, new governmental policies threaten the viability of
managed care. The AVC reflects one such effort. In addition, the
continuing-and seemingly never-ending-congressional discussion about a
federal patient protection act reflects a similar governmental approach to
239 Kim Dixon, Aetna Sees Earnings to Doubling Estimates, REUTERS Bus. REP., Oct. 9,
2002, at http://www.insurance-portal.com/101002.htm#9; see also Now-profitable Aetna
Axing 2,750 Jobs, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 27, 2002, at 2C (reporting an Aetna
spokesperson's acknowledgment that the company intentionally cut unprofitable plan
members and planned further membership cuts to reach 13.7 million members by the end of
2002).
240 See Dixon, supra note 239.
241 Reed Abelson, Hard Decisions for Employers As Costs Soar in Health Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2002, at C1 (noting that employers were facing a third straight year of
double-digit increases in health care costs and that double-digit increases were last common
in the 1980s and early 1990s).
242 Id. (stating that increases stem from rising hospital admissions, increasing labor costs,
and dramatic increases in prescription drug prices).
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prevent risk shifting.243  Such efforts have encouraged the managed care
industry to find other mechanisms by which export their costs. Since it
appears that the employers have reached the limits of the costs they are
prepared to assume, the consumer is left as the next recipient of the health care
risk.
This explains the latest wave of so-called "consumer-driven" health plans,244
such as defined-contribution plans. 245 Under such plans, the employee is given
a specific amount of money with which to purchase health care. 246 Once this
dollar amount is used up, the employee is responsible for the costs of his own
health care, with the exception of catastrophic coverage. 247 The theory behind
the plans is that patients will deal directly with providers, and, because they are
responsible for payment, they will be more prudent purchasers of health
care.248 Theoretically, this will hold down the costs of health care. In effect,
however, the consumer is actually being called upon to assume the role of
insurer of the consumer's own health care expenditures. The consumer is
asked to take on the risk that the premium he collects-in the form of the
243 Amy Goldstein, Patients 'Rights Talks Hit impasse, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2002, at A4
(describing Congress's failure to reach agreement on patient protection legislation, which
would provide consumers with a means to redress injuries caused by managed care
treatment decisions), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32020-
2002Augl.html; see also Hampton, Markets, supra note 4, at 1023-24 (discussing the
impact of removing the HMOs' exemption from liability for improper medical necessity
determination).
244 See John K. Iglehart, Changing Health Insurance Trends, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 956,
960 (2002) (noting that insurers and employers are increasingly using the term "consumer-
driven health care" when referring to new coverage arrangements); see also Kathy M.
Kristof, New Health-Care Plans May Not Be a Panacea, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002 (stating
that consumer-driven health plans are a growing trend in an effort to make consumers spend
more prudently when seeking health care), available at http://www.latimes.com/la-fi-
perfin25aug25.story.
245 See lglehart, supra note 244, at 960-61 (stating that defined-contribution plans have
only been developed recently and were traditionally used in the context of pension benefits
for retirees); see also Eric W. Ford, Economic Implications of Defined Contribution Health
Plans, 37 Bus. ECON. 38, 39-40 (Jan. 2002).
246 Iglehart, supra note 244 ("Under this approach, the employee would pay for any costs
that exceeded the employer's contribution, up to a maximal amount, beyond which
insurance would cover the cost of a serious or catastrophic illness."); Ford, supra note 245,
at 39, 40-41 (discussing different types of defined-contribution plans).
247 See lglehart, supra note 244, at 961; see also Kristof, supra note 244 (providing an
example of an employee with a $1,000 annual health-care account from employer and a
$2,500 deductible with the insurer, where, after the first $1,000 is spent in medical
expenses, the employee would be responsible for payment of the remaining $1,500 of the
$2,500 deductible).
248 See Iglehart, supra note 244, at 961 ("The assumption is that people will be more
prudent in purchasing health care services if they recognize that they are spending their own
money.").
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defined contribution-will exceed the consumer's expenditures for health care.
This is, of course, the essence of the business of insurance. Over the long
term, it is unlikely that consumers will be able to manage risk, control costs,
and ensure quality better than the managed care industry, employers, and
health care providers that the consumers will be forced to replace.
